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Abstract
Background: Social networks are often highly skewed, meaning that the vast majority of the population has only
few contacts whereas a small minority has a large number of contacts. These highly connected individuals may
play an important role in case of an infectious disease outbreak.
Methods: We propose a novel strategy of finding and immunizing highly connected individuals and evaluate this
strategy by computer simulations, using a stochastic, individual-and network-based simulation approach. A small
random sample of the population is asked to list their acquaintances, and those who are mentioned most
frequently are offered vaccination. This intervention is combined with case isolation and contact tracing.
Results: Asking only 10% of the population for 10 acquaintances each and vaccinating the most frequently named
people strongly diminishes the magnitude of an outbreak which would otherwise have exhausted the available
isolation units and gone out of control. It is extremely important to immunize all identified highly connected
individuals. Omitting a few of them because of unsuccessful vaccination jeopardizes the overall success, unless
non-immunized individuals are taken under surveillance.
Conclusions: The strategy proposed in this paper is particularly successful because it attacks the very point from
which the transmission network draws its strength: the highly connected individuals. Current preparedness and
containment plans for smallpox and other infectious diseases may benefit from such knowledge.
Background
Super-spreader events (cf. [1]) crucially influence the
course of infectious disease outbreaks, as has been
shown for SARS, measles and smallpox. Targeting con-
trol efforts on individuals with highest potential to
spread disease is more effective than mass control [1].
This is very important for diseases like smallpox for
which herd immunity is decreasing and stockpiled vac-
cines are of low eligibility or uncertain immunogenicity
[2-6]. Specific information on social networks and on
their contact structures is still scarce, but common
properties have been revealed for many networks [7]: it
has been shown that the degree distribution of social
networks are frequently highly skewed, i.e. they are
bound together by just a few very highly connected indi-
viduals. The frequency of contacts in such networks is
not Poisson distributed (as would be expected in
networks which originate from a random mixing pro-
cess), but follows a skewed and long-tailed distribution
[8]: the vast majority of the population has rather few
contacts whereas a small minority has a huge number of
contacts. Highly skewed networks are ubiquitous in nat-
ure and it seems that this particular topology confers
“dynamical robustness and reliability to perform a cer-
tain function in the presence of perturbations” [9].
Indeed, a highly skewed frequency distribution of the
number of contacts per person has some astonishing
effects on the transmission of infection diseases and on
the effect of interventions [1]. In contrast to the results
with an assumption of a homogeneous mixing popula-
tion, the disease transmission is only marginally reduced
if a percentage of individuals is immunized at random
and, thus, “removed” from the transmission network. In
the presence of highly connected individuals, even the
celebrated basic reproduction number R0,o r i g i n a l l y
defined as “the average number of secondary cases
c a u s e db yas i n g l ei n d e xc a s ei nac o m p l e t e l yn o n -
immune homogenously mixing population where no
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outbreak can occur or not [8,10-13].
These same highly-connected individuals which stabi-
lize the transmission properties of a skewed contact net-
w o r ki nt h ec a s eo fr a n d o m“removal” of individuals,
also make these networks vulnerable, if they can be
identified and “removed”. One approach to identify
them, considering a theoretical infection process spread-
ing on a skewed contact network, has been termed
“acquaintance immunization” [14,15]. Here, people are
picked at random and asked to name one contact each
who will then be vaccinated. People with many contacts
are most likely to be mentioned by somebody and are
very likely to be vaccinated. An even more efficient
strategy has been found by assuming that individuals
can guess information about their neighbors and their
contacts [16]. Acquaintances have also been shown to
be good social network sensors for early detection of
outbreaks [17].
Inspired by Cohen et al. [14,15], the aim of the present
paper is to explore the effect of such targeted immuniza-
tion strategies on the course of an epidemic considering
a real disease -smallpox- using pessimistic assumptions
and suboptimal vaccines. We use computer simulations
based on a stochastic transmission model where indivi-
duals are connected with each other in two superimposed
networks, which allows us to distinguish between close
contacts (comprising family members and close friends
which can easily be traced) and casual contacts who will
be more worrisome in case of an outbreak, because they
are more difficult to detect and to be placed under sur-
veillance. For the latter ones, we use a highly skewed net-
work. Our baseline intervention scenario considers case
isolation (with a limited capacity) and tracing of close
contacts which we combine with a pre-emptive vaccina-
tion of highly connected individuals. In our simulations,
we identify highly connected individuals by first “asking”
a small random fraction of the population to supply the
names of their casual contacts. The most frequently men-
tioned contacts are then offered to be vaccinated.
Depending on the simulation scenario, only a fraction of
the contacts can be named, or alternatively, only a frac-
tion of the most frequently mentioned contacts can be
immunized (this may be caused by combination of a low
vaccination eligibility and an imperfect vaccine efficacy).
In some of the considered scenarios, highly connected
individuals are additionally placed under surveillance for
an indefinite duration, so that they can be prevented
from spreading the infection.
Methods
We use a stochastic, individual- and network-based
simulation approach. Individuals have discrete states
which can be changed by events that are scheduled on a
continuous time scale and executed using a discrete
event simulation algorithm. Executed events can trigger
future events which affect the same individual or
-through the contact network- other individuals.
Contact network
The population consists of 100,000 fully susceptible
individuals which form the nodes of a network graph.
The contact network is a combination of two networks,
representing two types of links: close contacts are repre-
sented by a two-dimensional toroidal square lattice with
eight nearest neighbours as contacts, a so-called Moore
neighbourhood; casual contacts are represented by a
highly skewed network created with the Barabási-Albert
algorithm that starts with a fully interconnected network
of 12 nodes and then uses preferential attachment to
add nodes [7]. Each individual of the population is char-
acterized by two internal states: the infection state and
the surveillance state. All individuals are 100% suscepti-
ble at the beginning of the simulation.
Smallpox natural history
The infection model which controls the natural history of
the disease is an extended SEIR-model (see Table 1 and
Additional file 1: Figure S1). The simulation starts with
all individuals being susceptible except for 100 randomly
selected individuals who are newly infected with the
virus. As their infection progresses, the infected indivi-
duals develop prodromal fever and then proceed through
a ne a r l yr a s h ,am i d d l er a s ha n dal a t er a s hs t a t e .Af r a c -
tion of individuals dies in the early rash state, all others
acquire a lasting immunity after recovery.
Transmission model
A detailed description of the infection process is given
in the Appendix.
Surveillance model
The surveillance model (Additional file 2: Figure S2)
controls individual states related to case detection, con-
tact tracing, observation, and interventions like isolation
or seclusion. At the start of each simulation, all indivi-
duals are unobserved. Two days after a yet unobserved
new case develops the earliest signs of a rash, he or she
is detected. Immediately after case detection, all close
contacts and 10% of the casual contacts of the case are
traced and put under observation which lasts for a max-
imum of 21 days (which is longer than the maximum
incubation period). Observed individuals are detected
immediately after developing prodromal fever. After
detection, cases ought to be isolated immediately, but
the number of isolation units is limited. To deal with
this limited resource, all detected cases first enter a
w a i t i n gq u e u e ;a ss o o na sf r e ei s o l a t i o nu n i t sb e c o m e
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vent all further contacts). While no free isolation units
are available, detected cases are asked to seclude them-
selves which means that they will prevent all casual and
50% of their close contacts. Secluded cases are immedi-
ately isolated when free isolation units become available.
Vaccination
Vaccination is implemented by first asking a fraction of
the population to supply the names of their casual con-
tacts. The most frequently mentioned contacts are then
pre-emptively vaccinated, before the outbreak occurs.
Technically, we first define the index cases and then define
the ‘vaccinated’ individuals, different from those who are
i n d e xc a s e s .W ed ot h i st oe n s u r eas t a n d a r dn u m b e ro f
index cases (100), all of them unvaccinated. Depending on
the simulation scenario, only a fraction of the contacts can
be named, or alternatively, only a fraction of the most fre-
quently mentioned contacts can be immunized (this may
be caused by combination of a low vaccination eligibility
and an imperfect vaccine efficacy). In some of the consid-
ered scenarios, vaccinated individuals are additionally
placed under surveillance for an indefinite duration, so
that they can be prevented from spreading the infection.
Results
In Figure 1, we explore the theoretical limits of what
can be achieved by “removing” highly connected
individuals from the contact network: the vertical axis
shows the maximum eigenvalue of the next generation
matrix of the casual contact network which predicts
the initial spread of the epidemic. The horizontal axis
shows the fraction of the population which is removed
from the transmission network (e.g. by immunization),
whereby the individuals are sorted by their number of
contacts, such that the most highly connected indivi-
duals will be removed first (red curve). Even if only a
small fraction of the population is removed, Figure 1
shows a steep decline in the eigenvalue, which clearly
indicates that removing the most highly connected
individuals has a huge effect on the index cases’ capa-
city to spread the infection, as has been shown in
other publications (1). The blue curve in Figure 1
shows a much less dramatic effect which is gained if
i n d i v i d u a l sa r er e m o v e da tr a n d o m-i r r e s p e c t i v eo f
their number of contacts.
The relevance of this finding can be seen in Figure 2,
which shows how the targeted immunization influences
the simulation results of an outbreak which starts with
100 index cases in a population of 100,000 individuals.
We start with a highly over-simplified situation in which
we assume that we can ask everybody in the population
to supply the names of all casual contacts, and later pro-
gress towards more realistic scenarios. The contacts are
Table 1 Simulation input parameters
Population size 100,000 individuals
Index cases 100 index cases
Latency duration 12 days (gamma distributed; C.V. = 18%)
Prodromal fever
duration
3 days (constant)
Early rash duration 3 days (constant)
Middle rash
duration
3 days (constant)
Late rash duration 16 days (constant)
Observation
duration
21 days (constant)
Case detection unobserved cases: 2 days after onset of early rash
(constant)
observed cases: immediately after onset of
prodromal fever
Case isolation
capacity
500 units
Contact tracing
finds
100% of close contacts
10% (maximum: 20 per case) of casual contacts
Case isolation
prevents
100% of close contacts
100% of casual contacts
Seclusion prevents 50% of close contacts
100% of casual contacts
Case fatality ratio 30% (after early rash)
Figure 1 Influence of the Removal of Highly Connected
Individuals on the Maximum Eigenvalue of the Next
Generation Matrix of the Remaining Casual Contact Network.
The curve shows median values of 100 simulations, given in
arbitrary units. Red and yellow curves: Individuals are first sorted by
their number of contacts; the removal starts with the person who
has most contacts and progresses towards less highly connected
ones. (a) Red curve: the horizontal axis shows what percentage of
the population has been removed. (b) Yellow curve: as before, but a
random sample of 90% of the selected individuals is removed. (c)
Blue curve: people are not pre-sorted by their number of contacts,
but are removed at random.
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nation, starting with the most frequently named person.
As described in detail in the Methods section, detected
cases are isolated or are asked to stay at home or to
seclude themselves from contacts with other individuals
( i fa l l5 0 0i s o l a t i o nu n i t sa r eoccupied); their contacts
are traced and taken under surveillance. If only case iso-
lation and contact tracing are used to fight against the
outbreak, the large initial attack overwhelms the public
health resources and the smallpox outbreak afflicts
more than 50% of the population. When additionally
targeting the vaccination on the most frequently named
contacts, an immunization coverage of only 4% yields a
median outbreak of less than 1,600 cases; a vaccination
coverage of 6% can further reduce the median to less
than 1,300 cases with a worst case scenario of under
1,700 cases.
Asking everybody in the population is clearly an
unrealistic task for any public health system. We will
next explore how the results change, if only a small ran-
dom fraction of the population is asked to name all
casual contacts. Figure 3 shows how the median out-
break size changes if only a small random sample is
asked. The horizontal axis again shows what percentage
of the population is vaccinated, whereby immunization
begins with the most frequently named contact. If we
are willing to vaccinate 10% of the population, it suffices
to ask a random sample of 4% of the population for
their contacts in order to obtain a median outbreak size
of less than 2,000 cases. For the highly optimistic goal
of having a median outbreak size of less than 1,000
cases, we have to ask 10% of the population to supply
the names of their contacts.
In reality, hardly anybody may be able to recall all
casual contacts. In the next refinement, we assume that
people are asked to supply only a limited number of
casual contacts. Figure 4 shows that an immunization of
10% of the population still yields very optimistic results,
even if the 10% randomly sampled individuals only
name 6 to 10 contacts each.
In the previous scenarios, we have assumed a vaccine
with 100% efficacy and we have assumed that every con-
tact which was scheduled for vaccination was also eligi-
ble, but these assumptions cannot be made for the
existing smallpox vaccines [2]. Figure 5 explores the
influence of an imperfect vaccine on the median of the
outbreak size.
Successfully immunizing as much as 80% or 90% of
the scheduled individuals may only be possible with one
of the new generation vaccines [2-6], and even this may
already be regarded as over-optimistic by some, yet this
assumption already increases the median outbreak size
considerably (Figure 5). The disproportionate effect of a
few vaccination failures on the simulation result can be
Figure 2 Influence of Perfect Vaccination of Highly Connected
Individuals on a Smallpox Outbreak. Efficacy = 100%. Simulated
outbreak sizes, caused by 100 index cases in a population of
100,000: the boxes show 25%, 50%, 75% quantiles, the whiskers
show 10% and 90% quantiles and the triangles show minimum and
maximum results (for 2% vaccination, the upper limit is not given,
as one of the 100 simulations afflicted more than half of the
population, as did all simulations for 0% and 1% vaccination).
Targeted vaccination: (a) everybody is asked to name all casual
contacts; (b) these contacts are sorted by frequency; (c) vaccination
starts with the most frequently named person and progresses
towards less frequently named ones. The horizontal axis shows
what percentage of the population is vaccinated.
Figure 3 Influence of Perfect Vaccination of Highly Connected
Individuals on the Median Smallpox Outbreak Size. Each point
was obtained from 1,000 simulations. Initial value: 100 index cases in
a population of 100,000. Vaccine efficacy = 100%. Targeted
vaccination: (a) a random sample of the population (percentage is
shown next to the curves) is asked to name all casual contacts; (b)
these contacts are sorted by frequency; (c) vaccination starts with
the most frequently named person and progresses towards less
frequently named ones. The horizontal axis shows what percentage
of the population is vaccinated.
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depicted in Figure 1: The removal of all highly con-
nected individuals (red curve) is necessary to really inca-
pacitate the transmission network; if only a random
sample of 90% of the highly connected individuals are
removed (yellow curve), it practically stays intact.
In our final scenario, we combine immunization tar-
geted to highly connected individuals (using an imper-
fect vaccine) with the surveillance of the vaccinated
individuals: each contact which is scheduled for vaccina-
t i o n ,w i l lb et a k e nu n d e rs u r v e i l l a n c e( i ft h ev a c c i n a t i o n
success can be determined, it is sufficient to observe
contacts with failed vaccination and contacts who were
excluded from vaccination). Figure 6 assumes that a
random sample of 90% of the individuals who are sched-
uled for vaccination can really be immunized. The blue
curve shows the median outcome with, the red curve
without additional surveillance of selected individuals.
Discussion
Our results show that a combination of a novel strategy
of finding and immunizing highly connected individuals
with case isolation and contact tracing can prevent a
large smallpox outbreak, with the advantage of vaccinat-
ing only about 10% of the population (Figure 2). This
low vaccination coverage considerably reduces the num-
ber of severe side effects and deaths due to vaccination
[2,3,18]. In the case of smallpox vaccines this is of para-
mount importance, as reported by Casey et al. 2006,
“after the inoculation of 37,901 people in the United
States, three deaths, two permanent disabilities, and ten
Figure 4 Influence of Perfect Vaccination of Highly Connected
Individuals on the Median Smallpox Outbreak Size. Each point
was obtained from 1,000 simulations. Initial value: 100 index cases in
a population of 100,000. Vaccine efficacy = 100%. Targeted
vaccination: (a) a random sample of 10% of the population is asked
to name casual contacts each (number of contacts asked is given
next to the curves); (b) these contacts are sorted by frequency; (c)
vaccination starts with the most frequently named person and
progresses towards less frequently named ones. The horizontal axis
shows what percentage of the population is vaccinated.
Figure 5 Influence of Imperfect Vaccination of Highly
Connected Individuals on the Median Smallpox Outbreak Size.
Each point was obtained from 1,000 simulations. Initial value: 100
index cases in a population of 100,000. Targeted vaccination: (a)a
random sample of 10% of the population is asked to name 20
casual contacts each; (b) these contacts are sorted by frequency; (c)
the most frequently named person is first scheduled for vaccination,
less frequently named ones follow. The horizontal axis shows what
percentage of the population is scheduled for vaccination. Because
of vaccination eligibility and/or vaccination efficacy, only a fraction
of those scheduled for vaccination can successfully be immunized
(percentage immunized is given next to the curves).
Figure 6 Combined Influence of Imperfect Vaccination and
Surveillance of Highly Connected Individuals on the Median
Smallpox Outbreak Size. Each point was obtained from 1,000
simulations. Initial value: 100 index cases in a population of 100,000.
Targeted vaccination: (a) a random sample of 10% of the
population is asked to name 20 casual contacts each; (b) these
contacts are sorted by frequency; (c) the most frequently named
person is first scheduled for vaccination, less frequently named ones
follow. The horizontal axis shows what percentage of the
population is scheduled for vaccination. Because of vaccination
eligibility and/or vaccination efficacy, a fraction of 90% (red curve)
or 100% (blue curve) are successfully immunized. Scheduled
individuals who are not immunized are permanently taken under
surveillance.
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during 2003” [6].
Successful control strategies proposed for an inten-
tional release of smallpox, vary from targeting high-risk
individuals to broader random vaccination campaigns
and no one control method can be identified a priori as
best [19-22]. Uncertainty with respect to transmission
before the onset of symptoms, residual herd immunity,
demographics and mobility exist, so their differing con-
clusions can largely be attributed to underlying differ-
ences in model structures and parameter assignments.
Our study is the first that uses a highly skewed contact
structure for a smallpox outbreak.
In comparison to previous modeling studies, and in
order to show the strength of this strategy, we focus on
a highly pessimistic scenario: (a) the outbreak starts
with the simultaneous infection of 100 independent
index cases on a fully susceptible population; (b) a high
proportion of transmission takes place during the pro-
dromal fever phase which does not yet reveal the nature
of the infection and which does not trigger case detec-
tion except for suspects who are already under surveil-
lance; (c) we consider a limited number of isolation
units which are easily exhausted by a major outbreak;
and (d) we consider suboptimal vaccines.
We have made a big effort to design a realistic model
and to use plausible parameter values, yet we made a
number of inevitable simplifying assumptions on aspects
that we consider out of the scope of the present paper.
Worth of mention is that we use a pre-assigned and
bidirectional contact network, to which we superimpose
a stochastic transmission process (see Appendix). The
contact network constitutes ‘potential contacts’ and the
actual transmissions occur according to the transmission
process. In reality, contact structures change over time
so it is uncertain whether all pre-emptively identified
highly connected individuals would play a role in a
future outbreak. Specially in acts of bioterrorism, super-
spreading events (cf. [1]) might be difficult to foresee
unless awareness is increased. We assume, however, that
highly connected individuals would have a potential for
disease spread and constitute a good first guess.
Our study is the first that addresses the problem of sub-
optimal vaccines in the case of smallpox. We show that a
network- based vaccination strategy strongly depends on a
very high vaccine efficacy and on a high eligibility and
compliance of the people selected for vaccination. It can
quickly lose its effect if some of the most highly connected
individuals cannot be vaccinated or if vaccination fails pro-
tect them (Figure 5). If only a few of them are left unpro-
tected, they can fuel a super-spreading event (cf. [1])
multiplying the infection in the population.
Adopting the described containment strategy may
require to overcome political, social and ethical hurdles.
A vaccination campaign against smallpox will not be
initiated anywhere before a strong suspicion of bioter-
ror attack occurs or the appearance of smallpox cases
inside or outside a country has been confirmed. As
long as a smallpox bioterror attack is regarded to be
highly unlikely, most people would not accept to
receive a potentially harmful smallpox vaccination any-
way. This perception may change drastically after
smallpox have reappeared somewhere in the world.
Individuals who have been identified to be under the
highest risk of contracting the infection may gladly
accept to be chosen to receive a protective vaccine.
Yet, due to their health condition, not all of them may
be eligible for vaccination. As it is very important to
remove all potential highly infectious individuals (Fig-
ure 5), highly connected individuals who cannot be
vaccinated or whose immunization has failed must be
taken under surveillance (Figure 6).
Considering the described containment strategy in
preparedness plans would shift their focus to identify-
ing potential highly infectious individuals and to pre-
paring for pre-emptive vaccination of a pre-selected
fraction of the population. It would also put emphasis
on the availability of isolation units and of people
trained in contact tracing and surveillance. If the pub-
lic health system is overtaxed by an outbreak despite
this targeted vaccination, containment strategies invol-
ving ring vaccination or large-scale vaccination should
be implemented. Public health emergency plans have
to provide instructions on (1) the observation of the
dynamics of an outbreak and (2) which observations
trigger the transition from a targeted containment
strategy to a population-based one.
Infections which share the same route of transmission
may also have the same highly connected individuals.
Knowing which individuals have many contacts (whereby
a “contact” depends on the mode of transmission of an
infectious agent) may help public health agencies to con-
trol whole groups of infectious diseases, including newly
emerging ones, rather than individual diseases. In specific
settings, highly connected individuals may be identified
using other approaches: in hospitals and companies, an
analysis of the team structure and its meeting schedules
can hint at who has most contacts. This may also affect
the focus of business continuity plans, written to prepare
for pandemic influenza or similar events. Simulation stu-
dies show that highly connected individuals are reached
rather early by newly introduced infections. Thus, the
knowledge of such people can also be used to improve
outbreak detection [17].
Conclusions
Current preparedness and containment plans for small-
pox and other directly transmitted diseases like measles
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the described pre-emptive strategy which effectively tar-
gets the fraction of the population fuelling disease
spread and minimizes vaccine related side effects.
Appendix: Details on the infection process
W ed e f i n ee i g h te x p e c t e dn u m b e r sEs,n of secondary
infections per index case which depend on the index
case’s infectious stage s Î {prodromal, earlyrash, mid-
dlerash, laterash} and on the network n Î {close,
casual} in which the secondary cases are produced
(Table S1). This distinction enables us to consider a
more intense exposure of close contacts and to modify
the cases’ contagiousness in their different disease
stages, as suggested by previous smallpox studies
[19,23]. We set the sum of these expected values to 5,
the estimate at smallpox’s eradication [24]. In a homo-
geneously mixing population, this would be called the
basic reproduction number R0.W eh a v ed e c i d e dt o
parameterize our model with these expected values
rather than the maximum eigenvalue of the next gen-
eration matrix, not only because expected values are
more intuitive, but also because estimates of R0 are
frequently based on secondary cases [14,23] or on
homogeneous mixing assumptions [25,26]. As the max-
imum eigenvalue better predicts the initial spread of an
epidemic, we use it in Figure 3 in the results. In the
simulation model, we implement the following infec-
tion process: when an individual enters one of the four
contagious states, it triggers future infection events for
each of its contacts. This is done in the following way:
( 1 )w ec h o s et h ee f f e c t i v ec o n t a c tr a t ebs,n such that
βs,n
 Ds
0
e−βs,ntdt =
Es,n
cn
, (1)
where Ds is the duration of the specific contagious
stage s and cn is the average number of contacts per
person in network n (for close contacts, cn is 8, for
casual ones, it is 24). Solving Equation 1 yields
βs,n =
−ln(1 − Es,n/cn)
Ds
(2)
(2) we draw a random number r from an exponential
distribution with mean 1/bs,n,( 3 )i fr is smaller than the
duration of the current contagious state Ds, we schedule
an infection event for the corresponding contact with
delay r, otherwise the infection event is discarded. Infec-
tion events are stored in an event queue. At the sched-
uled time, it is checked whether the infection source is
still contagious, the prospective victim is still susceptible
and the contact between the two has not yet been
impeded by interventions (e.g. isolation or seclusion)
(see Table 1). The infection only takes place if all of
these three conditions are fulfilled.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Figure S1. Infection model.
Additional file 2: Figure S2. Surveillance model.
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